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Facts
The facts giving rise to the Mutembo Nchito case are well known as they largely played out in
the public arena. The petitioner, Mutembo Nchito, was appointed as Director of Public
Prosecution (DPP) in 2011 by President Sata (who later died in office in October 2014 and was
succeeded by Edgar Lungu). In March 2015, President Edgar Lungu suspended Nchito from
office and established a Tribunal to investigate his suitability for remaining in office. The terms
of reference for the Tribunal revolved around two categories of allegations. The first category
impugned his irregular entry of nolle prosequi allegedly in abuse of his power, including in a
criminal case against him. The second category related to taking over and subsequently
discontinuing prosecution of criminal cases in matters he allegedly had personal interest. The
Tribunal had three members: retired Chief Justices Annel Silungwe (as chairperson), Mathew
Ngulube, and Ernest Sakala. Following the Tribunal’s conclusion of its work, the President in
August 2016 wrote Nchito a letter to the effect that he had relieved him of his duties, on the
recommendation of the Tribunal, pursuant to Article 144 of the Constitution. The Tribunal’s
findings and report were never made public and Nchito himself was not availed the report. On
that basis alone, it is impossible to know whether or not the President exercised his powers to
remove the DPP on proper motives. Nchito challenged his removal but the Constitutional Court
ruled that the President acted constitutionally in removing him.

Holding
The Constitutional Court held that the President acted constitutionally in removing Mutembo
Nchito as DPP.

Significance
Constitutional Courts were designed to superintend constitutional order through adjudicating
constitutional disputes in a manner that fosters the deepening of democracy and vindicates
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constitutional norms. Historically, constitutional courts have been associated with the
entrenchment of the rule of law and liberal democracy, following their emergence and
development around the world, from the time they appeared in Europe in the early 20th century,
and are now dotted all over Asia, Latin America and Africa. These specialised courts have
been hailed as enforcers of democratic norms and mediators of democratic allocation of
constitutional power in a manner that thwarts excessive accumulation of power in one
individual or entity, thereby maintaining a reasonable balance between and among the key
branches of government.

Constitutional courts have been seen as symbols of constitutionalism and the rule of law. It is
undoubtedly for this reason that the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 2 of 2016
enacted the establishment of the Constitutional Court (Concourt). Upon reading the various
Constitutional Commission Review reports that recommended the establishment of the
Constitutional Court, one gets a clear perspective that Zambians wanted a departure from
judicial escapism, inefficiency, a formalistic, narrow, and superficial adjudication of
constitutional matters. Zambians have, in essence, been looking for a court that would bring
positive change to constitutional adjudication by being a midwife of contextually relevant
jurisprudence through interpreting the Constitution in a manner that advances constitutionalism
and democracy. The problem is that the Zambian Constitutional Court, judged by the depth of
its jurisprudence, does not seem to fit into the legacy of other progressive constitutional courts
such as the South African Constitutional Court. The latest demonstration of this is to be found
in the recent decision of the Court relating to the removal of Mutembo Nchito as Director of
Public Prosecution (DPP).

The Constitutional Court on 27 October, 2020 rendered its judgment in the case of Mutembo
Nchito v Attorney General 2016/CC/0029 (27 October 2020). Taking the Mutembo Nchito
judgment as a microcosm of the Constitutional Court judgments, the decisions of the Court
tend to be thinly reasoned, under-researched, lacking in critical reflection, deficient in rigorous
legal analysis, demonstrating a mechanical and unreflective reliance on precedents, and above
all, contextually irrelevant. The Court is simply sanctifying the jurisprudence of executive
righteousness, akin to what former Kenyan Attorney General, Amos Wako, stated in 1991 that
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“a characteristic of the rule of law is that no man, save for the president, is above the law.” 4
The globally respected Ghanaian constitutional law scholar, Professor Kwesi Prempeh aptly
described this problem in the following words: “[t]he result, in the African context, is what I
have called a ‘jurisprudence of executive supremacy’- a jurisprudence that is unduly deferential
to executive power, and, at best skeptical of ‘novel’ claims rooted in modern conceptions of
constitutionalism.” 5

Before addressing substantive defects of the judgment, we would like to say a few words about
the Constitutional Court’s seeming inefficiency. It took four years for the Court to dispose of
this straightforward case. The court largely blames the delay on the parties for being “locked
in interlocutories.” The Court does not explain how and why resolving interlocutory matters
took so long. A perusal of the record shows that the case was concluded in September 2019. It
therefore took the Court more than a year to render a mere 50-page judgment. The Court offered
no apology or explanation for its own delay, which is manifestly a violation of Article 118(2)(b)
of the Constitution which requires that “justice shall not be delayed.” Obviously, this delay
cannot be justified on the basis of the depth of research conducted, as the judgment, apart from
routine references to case law and statutes, only made reference to two other publications:
Black’s Law Dictionary and Garth Thornton’s Legislative Drafting book. Considering the
importance of the case to the constitutional life of the state, the display of inadequate research
in this judgment is by any standard shocking. It also bears noting that the Constitutional Court
is a new court which has no case backlogs and has a very low caseload (as compared, for
example, with the Supreme Court which had in excess of 4,000 case backlogs prior to the
establishment of the Court of Appeal).

Courts are creatures of the Constitution and accountable under the Constitution. Article 118 (1)
of the Constitution provides that judicial authority derives from the people and should be
exercised in a manner that promotes accountability. Delivering a judgment more than a year
after the case closed, without any explanation or apology, is inconsistent with the spirit of
accountability dictated by the Constitution. In the case of the Constitutional Court, this is not
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an isolated case, this having been reflected in a number of cases such as the appeals relating to
the Lusaka Central and Munali constituency election disputes.

An accountable court is sensitive to the inconvenience it may cause to the litigants and keeps
those concerned well updated. The inconvenience is also apparent in relation to the
development of constitutional precedence, not to mention the ever-learning general citizenry
that looks forward to speedy resolution of contentious constitutional matters. A relatively
recent UK High Court judgment involving Zambian litigants (see the case of Dominic
Liswaniso Lungowe & Others v Vedanta Resources Plc and Konkola Copper Mines [2016]
EWHC 975 (TCC)) is instructive in how other judges take matters of efficiency seriously. The
Judge delayed issuing the decision by only a few weeks, but apologized profusely and offered
the following convincing explanation for the delay:

The applications were heard over three days in mid-April 2016. The first full draft of this Judgment was
prepared in the four days immediately thereafter, after which I went on circuit until the end of May. As
I explained to the parties at the outset of the hearing, the logistical difficulty that I faced was that I could
not take the 24 lever arch files on circuit, which meant in consequence that the final 'polishing' stage in
the production of this Judgment was delayed for longer than I would have wished.

Unlike the UK High Court which only delayed handing down its decision by a few weeks but
apologized and offered a cogent explanation, the Constitutional Court in the Mutembo Nchito
case offered no apology or explanation for handing down a judgment more than a year after
the case closed.

Now to the substance of the judgment. A reading of the Mutembo Nchito judgment makes one
wonder where the Court is taking the country in terms of constitutional jurisprudence. It should
be recalled at this stage that the terms of reference for the Tribunal empanelled to probe Nchito
relate to his granting of the nolle prosequi and the taking over and discontinuance of trials he
is alleged to have had personal interest in. The Constitutional Court had a golden opportunity
to develop progressive jurisprudence that would ensure the DPP would be accountable for the
exercise of their constitutional powers when it considered the case of Milford Maambo and
Others v The People 2016/CC/R001 [2017], but squandered it. It instead held that the DPP
enjoyed absolute or unfettered discretion in the exercise of their powers, and was not even
answerable to the courts. Although we do not agree with this decision (because in a
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constitutional democracy power is given for purposes consistent with underlying constitutional
values), it represents the current position of the ‘law’ until a future court reverses it. This being
the ‘law’, it follows that how the DPP exercises power under the Constitution is unassailable.
Taking the Milford Maambo decision to its logical conclusion would actually mean that it was
unconstitutional to set up a Tribunal to probe into how the DPP exercised unfettered discretion.
Ironically, whatever the findings of the Tribunal, the authority of Milford Maambo (a very bad
precedent) suggests that Nchito was removed from office for doing no recognizable wrong
under the Constitution. Perhaps that is why the Nchito judgment does not point at any wrong
he committed. In granting nolle prosequi and discontinuing criminal matters, Nchito as then
DPP was simply exercising his unfettered discretion, as propounded by the very Constitutional
Court! How ironic.

In arriving at the conclusion that the President acted constitutionally in removing Nchito, the
Court refused to consider the process leading to his removal. The Court actually went out of its
way to preclude him from producing witnesses before it on the pretext that the matters he raised
were purely legal in nature. By concluding that the President acted constitutionally in removing
Nchito, the Court simply relied on its interpretation of Article 58 of the Constitution (now
repealed). There are many things wrong with how the Court dealt with the process leading to
the removal of the DPP. Due to limited space, only three shall be highlighted here.

First, the Tribunal’s findings were never made public. But more significantly, the petitioner
was not furnished with a copy of the Tribunal’s report. The petitioner had actually applied to
the Court to order that he be furnished with the report. A single judge of the Court in a ruling
of 19 October, 2016 declined to grant the application on the pretext that ordering the release of
the report would require the interpretation of the Constitution, which power, according to his
reading of Article 129(1) and (2) of the Constitution, a single judge did not have. This is mere
casuistic sophistry. It is logically impossible to reach the conclusion the judge reached without
actually interpreting the Constitution. In arriving at the conclusion that he could not grant the
order as a single judge, the judge was actually interpreting the text of the Constitution. His
decision was based on the interpretation of provisions he believed divested him of jurisdiction
to interpret the Constitution. He did not just close his eyes and pick lots. He simply preferred
an interpretation that did not advance the interests of the petitioner and justice. There is actually
no provision in the Constitution that divests a single judge from interpreting the Constitution
in order to resolve an interlocutory matter. In any case, considering that the Constitution is the
8
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supreme law that gives life to all other laws, it is impossible to conceive of an interlocutory
ruling a judge can give in a constitutional matter that does not directly or indirectly involve
interpretation of the Constitution. All the interlocutory rulings made by single judges of the
Court so far actually demonstrate that they were interpreting the Constitution. Otherwise what
else could have been the source of their authority to make those rulings?
The full bench of the Constitutional Court later considered the issue of the petitioner not being
furnished with the Tribunal report. Surprisingly it placed the blame on the petitioner in not
renewing the application for discovery of the report before the full bench of the Court. Although
the Court ordered that the petitioner was entitled to the report, it made no consequential orders
arising from that finding. Put simply, this Court’s finding did not alter the fate of the petitioner.
If the petitioner was entitled to a copy of the report but did not get one, that is a violation of his
rights, for which the Court should have provided redress. Strangely, the Constitutional Court
did not link this to the violations of any constitutional norms, not even any of the basic national
values and principles enshrined in Article 8 and decreed to “apply to the interpretation of the
Constitution and enactment and interpretation of the law” by Article 9 of the Constitution.
Comparative jurisprudence shows that failure to furnish a concerned person with reasons for
an adverse decision affecting them should be fatal to the process. For example, a three-member
panel of the Kenyan High Court in the case of Joseph Mbalu Mutava v Attorney General &
another [2014] eKLR considered a similar situation where the Judicial Service Commission
commenced the process of the removal of a judge and escalated the process to the president to
suspend the judge without giving the concerned judge a report of their findings. The Court not
only considered that this was a violation of the judge’s right to fair administrative action (a
constitutionally protected right under the Kenyan Constitution), but also that this was a
violation of fundamental constitutional values. It stated:

In addition to implementing the provisions of the Constitution, the Commission is guided by the values
of Article 10 which include the value of good governance, transparency and accountability. Giving
reasons for actions undertaken by a constitutional body is in our view a key hallmark of good governance,
transparency and accountability. In this case, it is our finding and we hold that the Commission had a
duty to furnish the Petitioner with the reasons for its decision that it abdicated this constitutional duty. 6

The Court considered this fatal to the process and ordered another more transparent process to
start. The Zambian Constitution contains similar constitutional values to those of the Kenyan
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Constitution. These are enshrined under Article 8 and include democracy, constitutionalism,
good governance and integrity. Article 9 demands that these values and principles are binding
and should be considered when interpreting the Constitution and other laws.

Yet for unclear reasons, the Constitutional Court generally tends to make decisions at variance
with these constitutional values and principles. Constitutional values are not mere lofty
aspirations or decorations. The express inclusion of fundamental values in national
constitutions was pioneered by Germany in the aftermath of World War II and this has become
a common standard in recent constitutions. Fundamental values are purposed to ensure that a
constitution should never be viewed as a neutral document that merely regulates state power,
but as a document that aims to impose a normative value system on the country. The
implication of this development is that whenever the constitution is interpreted, the courts
should choose an interpretation that accords, promotes and effects those values embodied in
the constitution. It is, therefore, mandatory for judges to justify their decisions in relation to the
enshrined constitutional values and principles. It is the only way the constitution can retain its
transformative character and avoid being a dead letter. The late former Chief Justice of South
Africa, Pius Langa, emphasized the importance of this transformative approach, which puts
constitutional values at the centre of constitutional adjudication in the following words:

The Constitution demands that all decisions be capable of being substantively defended in terms of the
rights and values that it enshrines. It is no longer sufficient for judges to rely on the say-so of parliament
or technical readings of legislation as providing justifications for their decisions. Under a transformative
Constitution, judges bear the ultimate responsibility to justify their decisions not only by reference to
authority, but by reference to ideas and values. 7

It is, therefore, anomalous that while the Zambian Constitution now expressly enshrines
underlining constitutional values and principles, these were never articulated and honoured in
this case. There remains no consequence for their violation as it is.

The second issue the Court ducked in relation to the procedure leading to the removal of the
DPP relates to the alleged bias of two of the three Tribunal members. These are Justices
Mathew Ngulube and Ernest Sakala. The petitioner considered that he would not get fair
treatment from the two because he had previous negative encounters with both. In relation to
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Justice Ngulube, the petitioner indicated that he played a role in exposing the ring of corruption
and abuse of public resources during the Chiluba Presidency (1991-2001), which led to the
resignation of Justice Ngulube, following an exposure to the effect that he (Justice Ngulube)
was a beneficiary of secret payments from an account operated by security agencies. (The
British High Court in the case of Attorney General of Zambia v Meer Care and Desai and other
[2007] EWHC 952) did actually confirm these allegations). In relation to Justice Sakala, the
petitioner indicated that he had made a personal complaint against him to the Minister of Justice
about his improper involvement in a case involving Nchito’s business interests. That being the
case, the Constitutional Court was duty bound to establish that the alleged bias did not affect
the integrity and findings of the Tribunal. Procedural fairness is a sacred standard in a
constitutional democracy. The importance of this was articulated by the South African
Constitutional Court in the case of Janse van Rensburg NO v Minister of Trade and Industry
NO 2001 (1) SA 29 (CC) when it held:

Observance of the rules of procedural fairness ensures that an administrative functionary has an open
mind and a complete picture of the facts and circumstances within which the administrative action is to
be taken. In that way the functionary is more likely to apply his or her mind to the matter in a fair and
regular manner. 8

More specifically in relation to bias, the South African Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Roberts
1999 (4) SA 915 (SCA) established a four stage test of bias, as follows:

1) There must be a suspicion that the judicial officer might (not would) be biased;
2) The suspicion must be that of a reasonable person in the position of the accused or the litigant;
3) The suspicion must be based on reasonable grounds; and
4) The suspicion is something that the reasonable person would (not might) have.

Assuming the facts were as the petitioner alleged, then the Tribunal members complained
against would manifestly not meet the requisite standard of impartiality.

If the allegations of bias were taken into account and established, it would be clear that the DPP
was not subjected to a fair removal process. The Constitutional Court, however, avoided
dealing with this issue. In a ruling of 18 April 2019, the Constitutional Court held that the issue
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of bias was improperly before it as it was a matter which should have been commenced via
judicial review in the High Court and not through the petition before it. The Court therefore,
did not consider the alleged bias of the commissioners. Despite this, the Court went ahead to
decide that the President acted constitutionally in removing the DPP. Considering that the
report of the Tribunal was not before the Court and that the Court never considered the process
leading to the removal of the DPP, the finding of the Court that the President acted
constitutionally is problematic as it is not based on any proved facts. In fact, it is a finding not
based on anything. Such an approach would give credence to suggestions by some stakeholders
that the whole process of the removal of the DPP was pre-determined. Transparency
International Zambia Chapter (TIZ), for example, had warned as follows:

What is worrying is that essentially, President Lungu and those that complained against Mutembo Nchito
have found him guilty of the offences alleged and now the Tribunal’s only task is to determine whether
he should be removed from office of DPP. This is [an] unfortunate precedent which should not be allowed
in this country. 9

This reasoning of the Constitutional Court on this score is manifestly troubling. How was the
Court able to determine that the President acted constitutionally in removing the DPP from
office without delving into the process leading to his removal? The exercise of constitutional
power cannot be divorced from the manner by which that power is exercised. Constitutional
power is given in order to further and not undermine constitutional values and goals. It follows
that there must be a rational connection between the process and the exercise of constitutional
power. The two cannot be splintered and dealt with in isolation, as did the Constitutional Court
in this matter. This is the approach the South African Constitutional Court, for example, has
taken in many cases. For instance, in the case of Ryan Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence
and Reconciliation and Others [2010] ZACC 4, the Court asserted that:

courts are obliged to examine the means selected to determine whether they are rationally related to the
objective sought to be achieved. What must be stressed is that the purpose of the enquiry is to determine
not whether there are other means that could have been used, but whether the means selected are
rationally related to the objective sought to be achieved. 10

9

Transparency International Zambia Statement on the Mutembo Nchito SC Tribunal, 2016
Ryan Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and Others [2010] ZACC 4

10

12

O’Brien Kaaba and Pamela Towela Sambo
The Court took the same approach in the case of Democratic Alliance v President of the
Republic of South Africa [2012] ZACC 24, when it stated: ‘[i]t also follows that if the failure
to take into account relevant material is inconsistent with the purpose for which the power was
conferred, there can be no rational relationship between the means employed and the purpose.’
That the Zambian Constitutional Court reached the decision that the President acted
constitutionally on mere reading of Article 58, without consideration of the process leading to
the President’s invocation of the power to remove the DPP is shocking.

The third issue that is troubling about the decision of the Court is that the petitioner had sought
several reliefs from it, including a determination on the issue of bias and conflict of interest by
two of the members of the Tribunal. The Court of its own motion urged the petitioner to
consider amending the petition in order to redact some reliefs sought but the petitioner did not
see the need to do so. In a ruling of 30 May, 2018, the Constitutional Court decided to proceed
to hear the matter on the basis of the petition as filed. However, at the instance of the Attorney
General, in a ruling of 18 April, 2019, the Court capitulated and struck off several reliefs that
the petitioner sought. The effect was that the main issues the petition was mounted around,
such as compliance with the procedural requirements under which the petitioner was removed
as well as the bias of the Tribunal members, were no longer under consideration by the Court.
Only two relatively innocuous claims remained, to do with access to the Tribunal’s report and
the constitutionality of the exercise of the power of the President in removing the petitioner. In
doing this, the Court seems to be developing a pattern of either changing the questions it is
asked by litigants or simply dropping some claims that may be perceived as politically
sensitive. The same approach was taken, for example, in the case of Daniel Pule and Others v
Attorney General and Others Selected Judgment No. 60 of 2018 where the Court was asked to
specifically interpret whether President Lungu would have served two terms of office at the
end of his current term, but the Court instead replaced the question, and proceeded to answer
its own question. This approach could open the Court to suspicion that it is deliberately
avoiding to deal with tough political questions which hinge on constitutional interpretation, the
result of which may not endear the Court to the executive.

As Professor John Hatchard has argued, such an approach “can be seen as a way of ensuring
that the most sensitive of political questions are avoided.” 11 With their ‘fig leaf’ approach to
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constitutional interpretation, it is very difficult for the Court to play a more meaningful role at
critical junctures in the life of the nation (as, for example, did the Malawian judiciary with
regard to the recent disputed presidential election). It must be said however, that by running
away from difficult political questions and defying known rules and best practices of judicial
practice, the Constitutional Court is undermining its own credibility and legitimacy, and in
consequence adding fuel to the already increasing public ridicule of its decisions.

In conclusion, we wish to note that the constitutional interpretive approach the Constitutional
Court has taken does not advance the values of constitutionalism and the rule of law.
Interpretation is the judge’s primary tool for articulating the law. The interpretive approach a
court takes can either be used to advance democracy and constitutionalism or it can undermine
the underlying values of the constitution. It is for this reason that Thomas Jefferson warned:
“Our peculiar security is possession of a written Constitution. Let us not make it a blank paper
by construction.” 12 A judiciary committed to constitutionalism should interpret the
Constitution in a manner that promotes the realization of its underlying values, not to
undermine them. Judging by the Mutembo Nchito judgment, it is hard to see how the
Constitutional Court’s decision safeguards the integrity of the Constitution and advances the
rule of law and constitutionalism. Perhaps it was for this reason that Supreme Court Judge,
Mumba Malila, in a recently published and well-articulated article penned in honour of the late
Justice Musumali, virulently admonished his colleagues in the Zambian judiciary: “[t]aking a
leaf from Mr. Justice Musumali’s sterling judicial performance, perchance it is after all not too
late for adjudicators in Zambia to begin to shake off the entrenched foundations of judicial
pusillanimity and the resultant self-restraint and lethargy, especially when it comes to
espousing human rights causes or deciding good governance issues.” 13 When will the Zambian
judges take up this challenge and heed Justice Malila’s plea?
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